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Lab 001 · Reference

Field reference

The main fields in the dataset and where they come from. You don't need this to start. Come back to it when a query or question uses a field you haven't seen.

Sources

Source Events Filter by
Sysmon 1,843,873 bifract_category or event_id
Windows Security 56,180 channel="Security"
Windows System, PowerShell, WMI, Defender, Application about 6,600 channel
Zeek 165,335 channel: conn, dns, ssl, smb_mapping, kerberos and others
Autoruns 11,162 artifact="Windows.Sysinternals.Autoruns"

Velociraptor collected the Windows logs and Autoruns, and artifact names the Velociraptor artifact each event came from. Zeek events have no artifact and identify hosts by IP.

Hosts and event types

Field What it holds Found in
hostname Short host name, like WS02 Windows events, Autoruns
computer_name Full host name, like WS02.meridian.internal Windows events
event_id Windows event ID. Sysmon: 1 process start, 3 network connection, 7 image load, 11 file create, 13 registry value set, 22 DNS query. Security: 4624 logon, 4771 Kerberos pre-auth failure. System: 7045 service install Windows events
bifract_category Bifract's name for the Sysmon event type, like process_creation, network_connect, file_write, registry_event, image_load, dns_query Sysmon
channel Windows log name, or the Zeek log type Windows events, Zeek

Processes, files and registry (Sysmon)

Field What it holds Found in
image, user, process_guid The process's path, account and unique ID All Sysmon events
parent_image, commandline, parent_process_guid The parent's path, the command line, and the parent's ID Process starts
original_file_name The name compiled into the executable, which survives a rename Process starts, image loads
trusted, tlsh Signing status and a TLSH fuzzy hash, added by Velociraptor. Only 245 process starts have a tlsh Process starts
image_loaded, signed The DLL loaded and whether it's signed Image loads
target_file The file written or deleted File events
target_object, details The registry key and the value written Registry events
query, query_results The name looked up and what it resolved to DNS queries

Logons and Kerberos (Security)

Field What it holds Found in
target_user_name The account logging on Logon events
ip_address Where the logon came from Logon events
logon_type 3 is a network logon, 5 is a service starting Logon events
status Kerberos result code: 0x0 is success, 0x18 is a bad password Kerberos events 4768, 4769, 4771

Network (Zeek and Sysmon)

Field What it holds Found in
src_ip, dst_ip, dst_port Both ends of the connection Zeek, Sysmon network connections
duration, orig_bytes, conn_state How long it lasted, bytes the client sent, and how it ended Zeek conn
query, answers The DNS name and its answers Zeek dns
path The share mapped, like \\DC01\IPC$ Zeek smb_mapping
client, request_type, success, error_msg The Kerberos request and its result Zeek kerberos

Autoruns

Field What it holds
category, entry, entry_location The type of autostart and where it's registered
image_path, launch_string What it runs
signer, sha_256 Who signed it and its hash